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THE PROBLEM WITH GENERAL UTILITIES: ARE
THERE SOLUTIONS?
The United States corporate tax system, contained in Subchapter
C of the Internal Revenue Code, has been a constant source of
debate and discussion. A corporate tax principle within this sys-
tem is the so-called General Utilities doctrine which states, with
certain exceptions, that a corporation does not recognize gain upon
distribution of appreciated assets. This Comment examines the
General Utilities doctrine and the problems associated with its ap-
plication and usage. The Comment also offers and discusses solu-
tions to the General Utilities problem including complete repeal of
the doctrine, implementation of a flat tax, and integration of the
personal and corporate income tax systems.
INTRODUCTION
The corporate income tax system in the United States, enacted in
1909,1 has remained largely unchanged since its inception.2 Never-
theless, many proposals for substantial reform have been offered
since 1959.1 Several recommendations for changing Subchapter C of
the Internal Revenue Code, dealing with distributions4 by corpora-
tions, have been offered by individuals,5 the American Bar Associa-
1. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909) (current
version at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9601 (1982)).
2. Although several amendments and codifications have slightly altered the cor-
porate tax system, its features have remained essentially the same.
3. REVISED REPORT OF ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER C OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (House Ways and Means 1959).
4. Unless otherwise noted, the term "distribution" will be used in the broadest
sense to mean any transfer of property or assets from the corporation to shareholders.
5. See, e.g., Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisi-
tions and Distributions, 33 TAX LAW. 743 (1980); Blum, Taxing Transfers of Incorpo-
rated Businesses: A Proposal for Improvement, 52 TAXES 516 (1974); Lewis, A Pro-
posed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquidations, 3 TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 1643 (1959).
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tion, e certified public accountants, the American Law Institute,8
state bar associations,9 task forces, 10 and, most notably, the Staff of
the Senate Committee on Finance."
This Comment will focus on the proposed revisions to Subchapter
C recommended by the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee Re-
port (Staff Report), "that would make major changes in the manner
in which corporations and their shareholders are taxed."' 2 A major
alteration recommended by the Staff Report is repeal of the General
Utilities3 doctrine, the cornerstone of corporate tax law since
1935.14 The General Utilities doctrine basically states that a corpo-
ration does not recognize gain upon the distribution of appreciated
assets, with certain exceptions.' 5 The history and subsequent applica-
tion of General Utilities will be examined and the reasons why this
doctrine should be repealed will be explored.
By recent changes to Subchapter C under the Tax Reform Act of
1984, Congress has attempted to improve the corporate tax system.' 6
These changes, however, have been primarily cosmetic and have not
addressed the underlying problem. In other words, congressional at-
tempts to reform the taxability of corporate distributions,'1 stock
purchases treated as asset acquisitions,' s and collapsible corpora-
6. American Bar Association Tax Section Recommendation No. 1981-5, 34
TAX LAW. 136 (1981).
7. FEDERAL TAX DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, TAXATION OF THE FORMATION AND COMBINATION OF BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES (1979).
8. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C
PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (1980) [hereinafter cited as
ALl REPORT].
9. See, e.g., A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325
(1972) (Committee on Tax Policy of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar
Association).
10. See, e.g., Income Taxation of Corporations Making Distributions with Re-
spect to Their Stock, 37 TAX LAW. 625 (1984) (General Utilities Task Force Report)
[hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
11. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., THE REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
12. Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 625.
13. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
14. Blum, Behind the General Utilities Doctrine, 62 TAXES 292, 294 (1984).
Blum argues that General Utilities is the "anchor" of the corporate income tax. But see
Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977) (the doctrine is
only one of seven leading principles of corporate tax). Recent erosions of section 311
have diminished the importance of the General Utilities doctrine for "going concerns"
but this doctrine remains influential in liquidations. See infra notes 71-78 and accompa-
nying text.
15. See infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
17. I.R.C. § 311(d) (West Supp. 1985).
18. I.R.C. § 338 (West Supp. 1985).
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tions,19 failed to simplify the unnecessarily complex federal corporate
and shareholder income tax system. Currently, serious abuses and
unintended hardships under the corporate tax system remain
unresolved.20
After an examination of the General Utilities doctrine, as well as
the Staff Report proposals and possible effects, alternative solutions
to the General Utilities problem will be discussed. Recommendations
for the repeal of General Utilities have been offered by commenta-
tors and organizations without analyzing different fundamental al-
ternatives to the current tax system. This Comment will attempt to
fill this analytical void by analyzing the possible ramifications of
each proposed alternative to the repeal of General Utilites.
Initially, this Comment will briefly examine the corporate tax law
as currently stated in the codes and regulations focusing on acquisi-
tions,21 liquidations,2 2 collapsible corporations, 23 and interim distri-
butions. Next it will discuss the General Utilities doctrine. After sur-
veying the history of and recent changes to this doctrine, the
Comment will discuss the problems of the doctrine and the solutions
offered by the Staff Report. Alternative solutions to the repeal of
General Utilities will then be analyzed. Finally, the Comment will
offer recommendations and conclusions with respect to the General
Utilities problem.
PRESENT LAW
Before examining the General Utilites doctrine, as well as its asso-
ciated problems and complexities, a brief survey of the current law
affected by this classical doctrine should prove beneficial. This expo-
sition will highlight only those code sections which relate to acquisi-
tions, liquidations, collapsible corporations, and distributions.
An asset acquisition transaction between two corporations gener-
ally results in a tax to the selling corporation 24 and a cost basis in
19. I.R.C. § 341 (West Supp. 1985).
20. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.
21. An acquisition is the act of becoming the owner of certain property.
22. A liquidation is the act or process of concluding the affairs of a firm or
corporation.
23. A collapsible corporation is one formed or availed of principally for the manu-
facture, construction, or production of property, or for the holding of stock in a corpora-
tion with a view to: (a) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders before the
realization by the corporation of a substantial part of the taxable income, and (b) the
realization by such shareholders of gain. I.R.C. § 341(b)(1)(1982).
24. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982).
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the asset to the purchasing corporation.2 5 However, if acquisition of
the assets of a corporation can be classified as a reorganization, it
will be nontaxable at both the shareholder26 and corporate 7 levels.
Under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 368, seven principal
types of reorganizations 28 prevent gain from being recognized. Some
general limitations exist, however, to the rule of nontaxibility,
namely continuity of interest and continuity of business enterprise.
Continuity of interest requires that the owners of the acquired corpo-
ration receive an equity interest in the reorganized corporation.29
Continuity of business enterprise requires that the acquiring corpora-
tion either continue the business of the acquired corporation or make
use of a significant portion of the assets of the acquired corporation
in order to receive nonrecognition of gain treatment.30
Shareholders of a corporation participating in a reorganization are
generally allowed to exchange their stock or securities for that of
another corporation which is also participating in the plan of reor-
ganization, without recognizing gain or loss.31 Gain is recognized,
however, on the receipt of boot by these shareholders to the extent of
the lesser of the amount of boot received or gain realized.3 2 Boot
may be taxed to the shareholders as gain from the sale or exchange
of stock or, as a dividend, if it has "the effect of the distribution of a
dividend. '3 3 If taxed as a dividend, the dividends-received deduc-
25. I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
26. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1)(1982): "In General - No gain or loss shall be recognized
if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities ...."
27. I.R.C. § 361(a)(1982): "In General - No gain or loss shall be recognized if
a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property . . . solely for stock or
securities ... .
28. Under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1982), the reorganizations include: (A) statutory
merger or consolidation; (B) acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or
part of its voting stock, of another corporation if, immediately after the acquisition, the
acquiring corporation has control; (C) acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely
for all or part of its voting stock, of substantially all of the properties of another corpora-
tion; (D) transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if
immediately after the transfer the transferor is in control of the corporation to which
assets are transferred; (E) recapitalization; (F) mere change in identity, form or place of
organization of one corporation; or (G) transfer by one corporation of all or part of its
assets to another corporation in a Title 11 or similar case.
29. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(1980) which requires a continuity of interest on
the part of those persons who were the owners of the enterprise prior to the reorganiza-
tion. This interest generally takes the form of stock or securities.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1980).
31. I.R.C. § 354 (1982). See supra note 26 for text.
32. "Boot" is the receipt of additional compensation, which is any property or
money received in an exchange in excess of property permitted under I.R.C. § 354 or §
355. I.R.C. § 356 (1982). For example, if, under a plan of reorganization, A Corporation
receives a condominium complex in Hawaii in addition to securities or stock of B Corpo-
ration and B merely receives the stock of A, then A recognizes gain on the receipt of the
non-securities compensation, namely the condominium complex.
33. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1982).
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tion"4 is available to corporate shareholders, but no loss from the
exchange or distribution may be recognized by shareholders.3 5
Generally corporate liquidations are untaxed at the corporate
level. 36 Assets may be distributed in kind 37 or sold within a twelve-
month period pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation" without
recognition of gain or loss. Shareholders who receive a distribution in
kind receive a basis equal to the fair market value of the property at
the time of the distribution, 9 and the amounts received in a distribu-
tion in complete liquidation of a corporation are treated as full pay-
ment in exchange for their stock.40 In other words, shareholders re-
ceive a stepped-up basis in the distributed assets without any portion
received treated as a taxable dividend.
There are several important limitations, however, to the general
corporate liquidation rules of nonrecognition of gain or loss. First,
the recapture rules generally override the nonrecognition rules for
liquidations." Second, the Supreme Court has declared that the tax
benefit rule42 limits nonrecognition in certain cases.4 3 Third, because
a taxpayer's accounting method must accurately reflect income, a
34. Corporate shareholders can deduct 85% of dividends received from a domestic
corporation. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1)(1982).
35. I.R.C. § 356(c)(1982).
36. I.R.C. § 336(a)(1982). An exception applies, however, to recapture items
which are taxed on liquidations. See I.R.C. § 336(b)(1982).
37. An in kind distribution in this context is a distribution of the property of the
corporation to its shareholders in complete liquidation. No gain or loss is recognized to a
corporation that distributes such property in complete liquidation. I.R.C. § 336(a)(1982).
38. I.R.C. § 337(a)(1982) states, "If, within the 12-month period beginning on
the date on which a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets..
.are distributed in complete liquidation... then no gain or loss shall be recognized...
39. I.R.C. § 334(a)(1982).
40. I.R.C. § 331(a)(1982).
41. See supra note 36. For example, if a corporation utilizes the LIFO inventory
method, then the LIFO recapture amount is treated as gain to the corporation upon
complete liquidation. I.R.C. § 336(b)(1982).
42. The tax benefit rule requires that if a taxpayer receives a tax benefit from the
subsequent recovery of a prior year deduction, then the amount recovered must be in-
cluded as income in the year of recovery. For further discussion of the tax benefit rule,
see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265 (1979); Byrne,
The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate Liquidations and Contributions to Capi-
tal: Recent Developments, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215 (1980).
43. See United States v. Bliss Dairy Inc., 460 U.S. 370 (1983). The Supreme
Court held that the tax benefit rule requires a corporation to recognize income with re-
spect to the distribution of cattle feed to its shareholders on liquidation. The Court rea-
soned that although I.R.C. § 336 shields a corporation from recognition of gain on distri-
bution of appreciated property, it does not shield the corporation from recognition of all
income on the distribution; § 336 does not permit a liquidating corporation to avoid the
tax benefit rule. Id. at 402.
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corporation may have to recognize income upon liquidation when it
has used an accounting method which was previously accepted but
currently rejected by the IRS. 44 Fourth, the assignment of income
doctrine4 limits nonrecognition of gain in corporate liquidations;
corporations in the process of liquidation are still taxed, despite as-
signment, on earned income.4
The rules for collapsible corporations 47 are rather complex. The
general rule for collapsible corporations is that gain to shareholders
from the sale or exchange of stock of a collapsible corporation, on
distributions in partial or complete liquidation, which otherwise
would receive long term capital gain treatment, is considered ordi-
nary income to the shareholder. 48 Although a collapsible corporation
may not liquidate tax-free under IRC section 33349 or sell its assets
tax-free in connection with a plan of liquidation under section 337,50
it can utilize the tax-free reorganization provisions under section 368
to possibly avoid recognition of gain.51
44. Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
342 U.S. 860 (1951). In Standard Paving, the Tenth Circuit upheld the commissioner's
right to utilize a method of accounting to properly reflect the income of the taxpayer. Id.
at 332. A construction company, in a tax free reorganization, transferred all its assets
subject to its liability to its parent which utilized the "completed contract" method of
accounting. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in its determination that the "per-
centage of completion" method of accounting more accurately reflected taxpayer's in-
come. Id. at 333. The Tenth Circuit relied on the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Jud
Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946). Id.
45. The assignment of income doctrine requires that the individual who "earned"
the income during the taxable year, recognize it despite any assignments or contracts to
the contrary. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940).
46. See, e.g., J. Unger, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957). In this
case, the Second Circuit held that when a corporation assigns to its only shareholder all
of its assets including accounts receivable but excluding cash as needed to meet impend-
ing liabilities, the corporation nevertheless exists for income tax purposes even though it
is in the process of liquidation. As a result, it is taxed on income "earned" during the
year. Id. at 93.
47. See supra note 23.
48. See I.R.C. § 341(a)(1982). The collapsible corporation rules were designed to
prevent the conversion of ordinary income to capital gains through formation of a corpo-
ration and subsequent sale of assets or stock prior to the receipt by the corporation of a
substantial portion of its ordinary income. The leading pioneers of collapsible corpora-
tions operated in the movie and real estate industries. For example, in Pat O'Brien v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 376 (1955), movie actors formed a corporation to produce a mo-
tion picture. The corporation then signed a distribution agreement with a movie studio to
obtain financing for the picture. At the completion of the film, the corporation ceased
doing business and assigned all its assets and rights under the distribution agreement to
its shareholders, the actors of the picture. The shareholders then sold their shares to the
studio in a tax-free liquidation and recognized capital gains on the sale of their stock. Id.
at 383. This case preceded the adoption of § 341 and illustrates the abuses which § 341
seeks to avoid.
49. I.R.C. § 333(a)(1982).
50. I.R.C. § 337(c)(1982).
51. Whereas I.R.C. §§ 333 and 337 strictly forbid a collapsible corporation from
utilizing these provisions to avoid recognition of gain, no explicit restriction is provided
1224
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Several limitations restrict the general rules applicable to collapsi-
ble corporations. The rules apply only to shareholders who own more
than five percent of the outstanding stock.5 2 Another exception to the
general rule is that more than seventy percent of the gain recognized
by the shareholder must be attributable to the section 341 assets5
3 of
the collapsible corporation." Furthermore, gain must be realized
within three years following completion of corporate manufacture,
construction, production, or purchase of the section 341 assets.5
The law concerning interim distributions states that if a corpora-
tion distributes LIFO inventory5" or appreciated property, it must
recognize gain on the transaction.5 7 Shareholders are also taxed at
ordinary income tax rates' if the distribution is a dividend. Divi-
dends include any distribtion out of corporate accumulated or cur-
rent earnings and profit. 9
GENERAL UTILITIES
Having briefly examined the taxation of corporate distributions,
an in-depth analysis of the General Utilities doctrine can be under-
taken. In General Utilities,0 the corporate taxpayer made a dividend
distribution to its shareholders of highly appreciated common stock
of another corporation, for subsequent sale by the shareholders to a
third party.61 The IRS argued that the dividend declaration was a
discharge of a liability owed to the shareholders of the corporation
and that this discharge of liability resulted in taxable income to the
under either I.R.C. § 368 (West Supp. 1985) or I.R.C. § 361 (1982).
52. I.R.C. § 341(d)(1)(1982).
53. I.R.C. § 341(b)(3)(1982).
54. I.R.C. § 341(d)(2)(1982).
55. I.R.C. § 341(d)(3)(1982).
56. The taxation of LIFO inventory is covered in I.R.C. § 472(b). The taxpayer
is required to treat the inventory at the end of the taxable year as: first, inventory goods
included in opening inventory (in order of acquisition); and second, inventory goods ac-
quired in the taxable year. I.R.C. § 472 (b)(1)(1982).
57. I.R.C. § 311 (West Supp. 1985).
58. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7)(1982).
59. I.R.C. § 316 (1982).
60. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
61. General Utilities Corporation had purchased stock of Islands Edison Corpora-
tion for $2000. One year later, an offer was made by a third corporation to General
Utilities to purchase this stock which now had a fair market value of almost two million
dollars but still had a basis of $2000. Instead of making a direct sale to the third corpo-
ration, General Utilities distributed the Islands Edison stock to its shareholders as a divi-
dend with the understanding that the shareholders would subsequently sell the stock to
the prospective purchaser.
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corporation under Kirby Lumber.6 2 Since this argument was never
raised before the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 the Supreme Court re-
fused to consider new issues raised on appeal by the IRS, 64 and sim-
ply held that the lower courts were correct in deciding that the cor-
porate taxpayer derived no taxable gain from the distribution of the
other corporation's stock to its shareholders.65 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court found that assets had not been used to discharge
indebtedness to shareholders nor was the transaction a sale.66
Thus, General Utilities stands for the proposition that a corpora-
tion recognizes no gain on a distribution of appreciated property rep-
resenting an in kind dividend.6 7 Nevertheless, this holding has re-
ceived various interpretations from commentators and courts who
have attempted to determine the ramifications of the so-called Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine.6 8
Congress formally codified the General Utilities principle in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.'9 The relevant code sections pro-
vided that no gain was to be recognized by the distributing corpora-
tion, except when the distribution consisted of LIFO inventory or
property subject to liabilities in excess of basis.7 0 Subsequent amend-
ments to the code and judicial interpretations of the doctrine created
additional exceptions to the General Utilities rule, including those
62. General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 204.
63. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 934 (1934).
64. The IRS argued before the Supreme Court that the sale of stock was, in
substance, made by the corporation itself. Brief for Respondent at 11-12, General Utili-
ties & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). Also, the IRS argued that
whenever a corporation distributes appreciated property to its shareholders, it results in
realization of gain. Id. at 10-11, 18-19, 25. Because neither of these arguments were
raised at the trial level, the Supreme Court could not consider them on appeal. General
Utilities, 296 U.S. at 204, 206.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court adopted these arguments when properly raised ten
years later. See infra note 72 (discussion of Court Holding decision).
65. General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206.
66. Id.
67. Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 629.
68. See, e.g., B. BITTKER AND J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS % 7.21 (4th ed. 1979); 2 MERKINS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCONE TAXATION § 11.27 (Zimmet & Stanley rev. 1982); Malloy, Some Tax Aspects
of Corporate Distributions in Kind, 6 TAX L. REv. 57, 59-60 (1950); Raum, Dividends
in Kind: Their Tax Aspects, 63 HARV. L. REV. 593, 599-605 (1950). See also Commis-
sioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d 529, 531 (3rd Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 862
(1954); Central Tablet Manufacturing Co. v. U.S., 417 U.S. 673, 679 (1974). But see
Albrecht, "Dividends" and "Earnings or Profits," 7 TAX L. REV. 157 (1952).
69. In the committee reports, both the Senate and House stated that sections 311
and 336 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 were intended to codify General Utilities.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4017, 4062; S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4677.
70. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 311, 336, 68A Stat. 3, 94-95, 106
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 311, 336 (1982)).
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for installment obligations,71 the imputed sale doctrine,72 the tax
benefit rule,7 3 and depreciable property, to the extent of its deprecia-
tion recapture potential.7 4 The somewhat schizophrenic congressional
behavior in this area of tax law can be attributed to the difficult task
of balancing revenue considerations and the harsh consequences of
double taxation.7 5
Recent congressional treatment further restricted the scope of the
General Utilities nonrecognition rule. In the Tax Reform Act of
1984, Congress limited the breadth of the nonrecognition rule by al-
tering the tax treatment of distributions, such that corporations now
generally recognize gain when they distribute appreciated property
in interim distributions.76 Previously, corporations only recognized
gain in interim distributions when distributing appreciated property
to redeem stock.7
71. See I.R.C. §§ 331(a), 336(a)(1982) listing I.R.C. § 453B (gain or loss to be
recognized on disposition of installment contracts) as a specific exception to the nonrec-
ognition rule).
72. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). The Court
held that the corporation was properly taxable on the sale of its sole asset that was
transferred, in the form of a liquidating dividend, to the two shareholders of the corpora-
tion. The Court reasoned that "[a] sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax
purposes into a sale by another by using the latter, as a conduit through which to pass
title." Id. at 335. In other words, the sale of the asset by the shareholders occurring
directly after receipt of the asset in distribution, was in substance and under the facts of
the case, a sale by the corporation because the corporation negotiated the entire sale.
Five years later, however, the Court confined Court Holding to its facts and allowed a
sale by the shareholders of property received in a distribution to be, in substance, a sale
by the shareholders. The Court stated that "a corporation may liquidate or dissolve with-
out subjecting itself to the corporate gains tax, even though a primary motive is to avoid
the burden of corporate taxation." U.S. v. Cumberland Public Service Company, 338
U.S. 451, 455 (1950). See also Leongard & Cobb, Who Sold the Bush Brothers Beans?
The Commissioner's Power to Ignore the Transfer of an Asset Prior to Sale, 35 TAX L.
REV. 509 (1980).
73. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). See
also supra note 43.
74. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1982).
75. Block, Liquidations Before and After Repeal of General Utilities, 21 HARV.
J. ON LEGIs. 307, 315 (1984). On the one hand, Congress attempted to provide relief
from the harshness of double taxation by creating exceptions (e.g., installment obliga-
tions) and continuing tax treatment (e.g., liquidations) while at the same time the courts
closed certain loopholes (e.g., the tax benefit rule). On the other hand, Congress greatly
limited the scope of General Utilities (see, e.g., the 1984 Tax Reform Act changes to
interim distributions), thereby increasing corporate tax liability while maintaining single
taxation in certain areas, namely liquidations. The irrationality of this different tax treat-
ment is explored further. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
76. I.R.C. § 311 (d)(West Supp. 1985). Several minor exceptions and limitations
to the general rule of recognition are listed in I.R.C. § 311(d)(2)(West Supp. 1985).
77. "If a corporation distributes property . . . to a shareholder in a redemption
... of part or all of his stock, then . . . gain shall be recognized." I.R.C. §
1227
With the exceptions and changes listed above, the General Utili-
ties doctrine is, in general, currently limited to nonrecognition of
gain or loss in liquidations. The question remains whether the
problems posed by the confusing code sections dealing with the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine warrant repeal of this doctrine. Additionally,
one must ask whether solutions other than repeal are available.
Before possible alternatives can be discussed, however, an examina-
tion of the issues and complexities posed by the General Utilities
doctrine is necessary.
The Staff Report identified several areas where General Utilities
presents problems, while another report (Task Force Report) lists
additional inconsistencies. 78 This discussion will focus on three of the
major problems and inconsistencies associated with the General Util-
ities doctrine.
The first troublesome area concerns the rules pertaining to collaps-
ible corporations.79 These rules are designed to prevent individuals
from using corporations to convert ordinary income into capital
gains;80 however, in actual application these rules are often very
complex. 81 Three examples will demonstrate the complexity involved
and the relative ease with which taxpayers can circumvent the pur-
pose of these rules.
IRC section 341(a) imposes ordinary income treatment on share-
holders if there is long term capital gain. Thus, if a shareholder has
many short term capital losses, he or she can liquidate an otherwise
collapsible corporation without penalty by selling the capital asset
within six months.82 Additionally, if section 341 applies, it will gen-
erally convert all gain on the sale of stock of a collapsible corpora-
tion into ordinary income, even if the gain on the manufactured
property is small. 83 Furthermore, since the minimum shareholder
ownership requirement is five percent in value of the outstanding
stock of the corporation, the collapsible corporation rules can be
avoided by merely having twenty-one equal and unrelated
shareholders.
The second problem area with the nonrecognition rules involves
31 l(d)(l)(A)(1982).
78. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 11-12; Task Force Report, supra note 10,
at 631-32.
79. See I.R.C. § 341 (1982). See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Ginsburg, Collapsible Corporations: Revisiting an Old Misfor-
tune, 33 TAX L. REv. 309 (1978).
82. A distinction drawn on the length of the holding period is difficult to justify
because, if the purpose of the rules is to properly classify all income, then conversion of
only long term capital gains to ordinary income falls short of this goal. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 11, at 11.
83. Id. A narrow exception applies to certain assets held longer than three years.
I.R.C. § 341(b)(1982).
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inconsistencies associated with "double taxing" interim distributions
but "single taxing" the sale and subsequent liquidating distribution
of corporate assets. This tax treatment can cause serious revenue
losses because a corporation with highly appreciated inventory that
would ordinarily distribute current earnings via dividends can reduce
its tax liability on existing inventory by almost seventy-five percent if
it sells all of its assets and liquidates.8 4 The selling corporation will
pay no tax on this inventory, the buyer will take a cost basis in the
assets, and the shareholders will receive capital gains treatment on
the liquidating distribution.8 5 Even if the business is not sold, a cor-
poration can distribute the appreciated inventory itself in liquidation
and recognize no gain.8 The shareholders receive a basis in the dis-
tributed assets equal to the fair market value at the date of distribu-
tion. As long as any subsequent sale by the shareholders is not at-
tributed to the corporation,87 the appreciation of the inventory will
never be taxed.
Third, further problems exist due to the continued favorable treat-
ment of liquidations. Allowing nonrecognition of gain on liquidations
promotes their utilization to distribute property to shareholders.
While the limitations on nonrecognition of gain on corporate liquida-
tions are complex and difficult,88 this favorable treatment results in
unsatisfactory results. Since a non-pro rata liquidation leads to a
tax-free step-up in basis, a closely held corporation can generally liq-
uidate without any tax burden,89 as long as the liquidating corpora-
tion has no earnings and profits. The net effect is that the taxpayer is
better off than if no corporate tax was imposed because the non-pro
rata liquidations under section 333 combined with the General Utili-
ties rule, permit the depreciation of wasting assets both at the share-
holder and corporate level.90 Furthermore, the current treatment of
84. Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 632. See also I.R.C. §
337(a),(d)(1982).
85. Id.
86. I.R.C. § 337(a),(d)(1982).
87. See Bush Bros. Company v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1982).
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in holding that payment of dividends in kind of
quantities of beans to all shareholders in a closely held corporation, and subsequently
sold, resulted in income to both the corporation and the shareholders. Id. at 255.
Additionally, the court relied on the imputed sale doctrine (see supra note 72) in find-
ing that Bush Bros. participated sufficiently in the sale to have the profits imputed to
them. Id.
88. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
89. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 12, 15.
90. Id. at 12. For example, suppose Corporation Y, owned 75% by A, an individ-
ual, and 25% by B, a tax exempt pension fund, owns depreciable real estate worth $300
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liquidation-reincorporations poses serious problems.91
Upon examining these problems and inconsistencies, reform of
Subchapter C appears necessary. The Staff Report recommends the
repeal of General Utilities by removing sections 336 and 337 from
the Internal Revenue Code. Additionally, the Report recommends
repeal of section 341 dealing with collapsible corporations. Parties in
corporate acquisitions could choose at the corporate level between
recognition (fair market value basis) and nonrecognition (carry over
basis) treatment under the Staff recommendation. Moreover, the
Staff Report would allow a shareholder to receive stock tax-free in
an acquisition, regardless of the characterization of the transaction
at the corporate level or the treatment of exchange as to other share-
holders. Finally, liquidations would be treated as cost basis transfers,
as long as the transferring corporation recognized gain.92
The net effect of these proposals would simplify the taxation of
corporate distributions.9 3 By eliminating sections 336 and 337, the
proposal would reduce statutory detail. Additionally, through the al-
lowance of an election of fair market value basis or carry over basis,
application of the complex definitional rules regarding reorganiza-
tions under section 368(a) would be avoided since most distributions,
regardless of form, would cause recognition of gain to the distribut-
ing corporation. Moreover, by making corporate nonrecognition
treatment expressly elective, the premium placed on sophistcated tax
planning will be reduced. 4
The repeal of General Utilities would produce several positive ef-
fects. First, the General Utilities doctrine has produced many unin-
tended benefits that Congress has repeatedly attempted to limit.95
Repeal would eliminate these abuses.
and has cash and securities worth $100. Y then liquidates under § 333, pursuant to a
plan which calls for the distribution of the real estate to A and the cash and securities to
B. Since A receives only depreciable real estate, he does not recognize income but re-
ceives a basis in the real estate equal to his prior basis in the stock of Y. Additionally,
because B is tax exempt, it recognizes no taxable income. See generally Rev. Rul. 83-61,
1983-1 C.B. 78.
91. Liquidation-reincorporations have two goals: the step-up in basis of deprecia-
ble assets at capital gains rates and the bail out of earnings at capital gains rates. As a
result of General Utilities and the accelerated cost recovery system (I.R.C. § 168
(1982)), pressure exists to effect liquidation-reincorporations to allow more rapid depreci-
ation on depreciable property not otherwise eligible for this preferential tax treatment.
Additionally, liquidation-reincorporations may be used to renew expiring net operating
loss carry-forwards. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 12. For further discussion of liqui-
dation-reincorporations, see B. WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINEss EN-
TERPRISE 817-903 (2d ed. 1982).
92. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 1, 16-24.
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id. at 25.
95. The General Utilities doctrine has produced the collapsible corporation rules,
tax benefit problems in liquidations, the recapture rules of sections 1245 and 1250, and a
host of problems. Id. at 27.
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Additionally, the tax incentive for corporate acquisitions, or merg-
ers, would be diminished because a corporation would no longer be
able to receive a step-up in basis of the assets of the acquired corpo-
ration without recognition of corporate tax. Under current law, this
tax-free increase in basis is a significant stimulus for corporate ac-
quisitions which otherwise would be unprofitable. In other words, the
tax system is currently non-neutral because it encourages acquisi-
tions merely for tax reasons and not for purposes of growth, effi-
ciency, and better management. The repeal of General Utilities
would make the corporate tax system more neutral because it would
cause recognition of gain on these transactions, and therefore, would
neither encourage nor discourage mergers.
Furthermore, since liquidations would no longer be preferred be-
cause gain would be recognized in both liquidations and interim dis-
tributions, corporate distributions under Subchapter C would be
treated equally. As a result, the goals of uniformity and neutrality
will be achieved because equal tax treatment will be accorded to
these similar "tax events."
The repeal of the collapsible corporation rules, which are notori-
ously complex,96 would follow the repeal of General Utilities because
their secondary purpose is to close loopholes created by the nonrec-
ognition of gain rules.97 Since these rules are relatively easy to cir-
cumvent and Congress must often try to restructure them,98 both the
government and taxpayers would benefit by their repeal.
The changes recommended by the Staff Report would also raise
tax revenues because gain would be recognized on a larger number
of corporate distributions. Since both corporations and shareholders
would be taxed on most distribution transactions, serious questions
concerning income realization would surface.99 Income realization is-
96. Ginsburg, supra note 81, at 325-28.
97. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 27. See Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acqui-
sitions, 38 TAX L. REV. 171, 213 n.114 (1983).
An alternative approach, recommended by the Treasury Department, would be to re-
peal the distinction between ordinary income and capital gains. As mentioned above, the
principal purpose of section 341 is to prevent the conversion of ordinary income to capital
gains through formation of a collapsible corporation. By eliminating the tax difference
between ordinary income and capital gains, section 341 would become unnecessary and
simplification could be achieved in a direct way. See Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplic-
ity, and Economic Growth, 25 TAX NOTES 873 (1984).
98. Congress attempted to restructure the rules under the Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 584 (1984) and TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 97
Stat. 324 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 341 (West Supp. 1985)).
99. Whether a corporate in kind distribution is a realization event subject to taxa-
tion is a subject of extensive debate among commentators. See Del Cotto, Sales and
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sues notwithstanding, shareholders would pay more tax than under
the current system. 100 Since no legitimate rationale for the phenome-
non of taxpayers being "better off" with a corporate tax exists,10' the
General Utilities doctrine should be repealed.
Although a simpler, more uniform, and more neutral corporate tax
would be attained, some problems have surfaced concerning repeal
of General Utilities. These arguments, however, are not persuasive.
The main argument against requiring corporate recognition of
gain on distributions of appreciated ordinary income property is the
harshness of imposing a double tax on these transactions. Even with
capital gain properties, the combined tax on corporations and share-
holders can reach forty-two percent.10 2 This is a substantial tax but
it is not as high as the seventy-three percent tax imposed on dividend
distributions.10 3
Proponents of this argument fail to recognize, however, that the
real issue is not whether the tax rates are too high or too harsh.
Instead, the issue is whether the tax system should treat distributions
in kind the same way it treats distributions of the proceeds of a sale
of property, and whether a double tax should be applied equally to
liquidating distributions and interim distributions.1 04 Different treat-
ment of the same "tax event" raises problems of horizontal equity; 05
the elimination of General Utilities would alleviate this problem.1 06
Other Distributions of Property Under Section 1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Real-
ized, and Related Problems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 219 (1977). See also Block,
supra note 75, at 329-31.
100. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 27. Since taxpayers receive appreciated
property tax-free and with a stepped-up basis, their subsequent gain on sale and resulting
tax is less, on balance, with a corporate tax than without one. This occurs because share-
holders would be fully taxed on the entire gain if no corporate tax existed. Id.
101. See, e.g., supra notes 89-91 & 100 and accompanying text.




105. Achieving horizontal equity involves treating equally taxpayers with the same
income. In other words, if two taxpayers each earn $25,000, one from dividends and the
other from labor, they should pay the same amount of total tax dollars. This would only
occur if both had the same deductions, exemptions, and credits.
106. As applied to liquidations and interim distributions, taxpayers with equal in-
come from different sources will begin on equal footing if General Utilities is repealed, so
that a better chance of horizontal equity could be achieved. This would occur because
gain would be recognized on both types of distribution transactions. For example, under
the current law, if Corporation A distributes highly appreciated stock with a cost basis of
$20,000 and a fair market value of $100,000 to its shareholders in an interim distribu-
tion, A would have $80,000 capital gain (assume long term) and will pay $22,080 in
taxes. By contrast, if Corporation B distributes stock with the same basis and fair market
value to its shareholders in a liquidating distribution, it recognizes no gain and pays no
taxes. Thus, horizontal equity is not achieved because both A and B have "realized"
$80,000 in income through similar events but A pays $22,080 in taxes while B pays
nothing. If the General Utilities doctrine were repealed, both A and B would pay
$22,080 in taxes.
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If rates are still too harsh, a change in the system or the rates is the
appropriate remedy, 0 7 not the retention of inappropriate nonrecogni-
tion rules.
Opponents of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine often
raise the "sufficient price" argument, which insists that the tax paid
by the distributee on a distribution is sufficient to allow this stepped-
up basis without recognition of gain.108 The problem with this suffi-
cient price argument concerns gain recognition and tax rates. No
guarantee exists that the shareholder's basis in his or her stock will
be the same as the basis of the corporation in its assets; therefore,
gain to each may differ. Additionally, the argument assumes that the
gain of the shareholder and corporation will be taxed at relatively
comparable rates. In fact, this rarely occurs. A shareholder could be
a tax-exempt organization or have losses which eliminate the tax on
distribution. Moreover, an individual shareholder's gain in a liquida-
tion will generally be taxed at a maximum of twenty percent, the
capital gains rate; whereas if the Staff Report proposal is enacted,
the corporation would be taxed on ordinary income up to forty-six
percent. 0 9
Supporters of the current system contend that, if General Utilities
is abolished, radical alteration of expectations and unfair undermin-
ing of tax planning based on the prior law will transpire. Generally,
proponents of this argument contend that corporations are formed
with the expectation that, upon dissolution or subsequent sale, only a
single-level capital gains tax will be imposed. This conclusion, how-
ever, overstates the situation. Corporations are generally formed with
the expectation of making profits, subject to capital and risk con-
straints. Most tax planners rarely consider the General Utilities doc-
trine when forming corporations. It is unlikely that most entrepre-
neurs even know what the General Utilities doctrine is. Regarding
future tax planning after the repeal of General Utilities, planners
will be provided with sufficient information about the new rules and
their application to act accordingly.
A common fear exists, however, that instability will result from
eliminating this anchor of the corporate tax system. Since several
code sections will be repealed, uncertainty will result in this area of
the corporate tax law. Moreover, tax practitioners will no longer be
107. See infra notes 109-65 and accompanying text for changes in the system and
rates.
108. Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 635.
109. Id.
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able to reap the financial benefits of advising clients regarding the
General Utilities doctrine. Admittedly, uncertainty will result tempo-
rarily, but eventually, under a fairer and simpler system, adjust-
ments will be made to return stability to the corporate tax arena.
Finally, concerns have surfaced about the disproportionate effects
of repeal upon small closely held corporations. 110 If General Utilities
is repealed, these corporations would probably sell all their assets
rather than liquidate to avoid the recognition of gain at the corpo-
rate level."' 1 Furthermore, closely held corporations might be forced
to receive less than fair market value for their assets because a pur-
chaser would understand that it could be faced with the same di-
lemma in the future. A possible solution to this problem would be to
carve out an exception for closely held corporations, analogous to
that pertaining to Subchapter S corporations.:""
The Staff Report makes a strong case for repeal of General Utili-
ties. A subsequent examination, by leading tax experts, recom-
mended the adoption of the Staff Report, with minor exceptions. 1 3
The arguments raised against repeal of General Utilities are not
compelling, while many advantages, including simplification and uni-
formity, are available with repeal. Accordingly, the General Utilities
doctrine should be repealed to obtain the advantages noted in the
Staff proposal.
110. Block, supra note 75, at 335. Arguably, closely held corporations tend to liq-
uidate more frequently than publicly held corporations, which contributes to discrepancy
in tax treatment. Additionally, the burden to closely held corporations, where assets dis-
tributed in a complete liquidation may be ordinary and not capital gain assets, is in-
creased because the cost of liquidation can be greater than fifty percent. But see Shaw,
The Impact of Proposed Tax Reform on Closely Held Corporations, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 287 (1985) (proposed changes will aid the small corporation).
11. But see I.R.C. § 337 (1982).
112. An exception could be created for corporations with fewer than 20 sharehold-
ers, whereupon only partial recognition of gain would be the rule. For example, a closely
held corporation could receive a 60% deduction on gains in liquidation or interim distri-
butions, similar to capital gains treatment. Other possible solutions are a shareholder
credit (see Blum, supra note 5, at 521, 526-27) and nonrecognition of gain for sharehold-
ers (see Lewis, supra note 5, at 1646). Compare I.R.C. § 1368 (1982).
113. Task Force Report, supra note 10. The Task Force recommends the recogni-
tion of gain or loss by the distributing corporation, with exceptions for certain types of
property (goodwill, § 1231 property, capital assets, etc.). Even though a majority of the
Task Force feels that complete repeal of General Utilities is not the "best solution" to
the General Utilities problem, the Task Force Report does recommend substantial modi-
fication of the doctrine. See also Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated
Property: The Case for Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
81 (1985). But see Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 638 (Minority Report); Nolan,
Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: Repeal of the General Utili-
ties Doctrine and Relief Measures, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 97 (1985).
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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Complete repeal of General Utilties appears to be warranted, but
is this strategy the best one to alleviate the problems involved with
nonrecognition of gain upon liquidation? Are there alternative solu-
tions which could be utilized to improve the taxation of corporate
distributions without repealing the General Utilities doctrine? This
section will explore two such alternatives: the flat percentage rate
income tax and the integration of the corporate and individual in-
come taxes.
Flat Tax
One possible solution to the General Utilities problem would be to
enact a flat percentage rate income tax ("flat tax"). 14 The flat tax,
proposed as early as ancient Rome,115 has had many diverse support-
ers including de Vauban,1 6 Napoleon, 117 James Mill,"" John Stuart
Mill, 119 John Ramsey McCulloch, 20 Adam Smith,' 2' and Arthur
Laffer. 22 This tax, however, has never been fully adopted or imple-
mented by any industrialized nation. 23 Nevertheless, the flat tax has
received increased attention lately 24 as an alternative to the current
114. A flat tax has a single tax rate applied to all levels of income. It is also known
as a "proportional" tax, which differs from our current progressive tax. A progressive tax
applies proportionally higher tax rates to higher levels of income.
115. The ancient Hebrews paid 40% of their national income as a tribute to Rome
at the time of Christ's birth. See H. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS 13 (1974).
116. Sebastian de Vauban, an advisor to Louis XIV, proposed the Dixme Royale
(10% income tax) and was probably the earliest advocate of a flat tax system. See D.
Doucette, The Economic Case for the Flat Percentage Rate Income Tax 9-10 (May
1983) (unpublished thesis). See also H. HIGGS, THE PHYSIOCRATS (1897).
117. J. WANNISKI, THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS 36 (1978).
118. See, e.g., D. WINCH, JAMES MILL: SELECTED ECONOMIC WRITINGS 412
(1966).
119. J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 807 (1978).
120. J. MCCULLOCH, TAXATION AND THE FUNDING SYSTEM 144 (1968).
121. See generally A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1978). (Smith offers 4
maxims for taxation, which are applicable to the flat tax: taxes should be levied in pro-
portion to the revenue enjoyed under the protection of the state; all taxes should be cer-
tain, not arbitrary; there should be convenience of payment; and there should be economy
in collection).
122. Laffer, Flat Rate Tax Could Ease Inequalities, L.A. Times, July 17, 1982, at
IV-3, col. 2.
123. South Africa has experimented with a "flat tax," and the Isle of Man, a
country located in the Irish Sea, has operated with a 20% flat rate tax. Wall St. J., Jan.
28, 1983, at 26, col. 2.
124. See, e.g., Etzioni, What to do About Taxes: Adopting a Flat-Tax Plan
Would Plug Those Unfair Loopholes, 98 L.A. Daily J., March 14, 1985, at 4, col. 3;
Kemp, Federal Tax Law: the Need for Radical Reform, 12 J. LEGIS. 1 (1985); Henkel,
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United States tax system. In fact, nineteen proposals involving the
flat tax were introduced before the 98th Congress. 125 The most popu-
lar were the "Fair and Simple Tax Act of 1984" (hereinafter Kemp-
Kasten) 12' and "Fair and Simple Tax" (hereinafter Bradley-
Gephardt) .127
Although not technically "flat tax" proposals, these bills embrace
several of the goals associated with flat tax systems.128 Since Kemp-
Flat Rate Taxes. An Analysis of Congressional Proposals to Reform the Income Tax
Code, 26 TAx NOTES 83 (Jan. 1985); Tapp, Flat-rate Tax Wouldn't Hurt Business, 130
Chi. Daily L. Bull., Nov. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 2; Ellentuck, The Flat-rate Income Tax:
Pros and Cons, 158 J. ACCOUNTANCY 124 (1984); Oddo, Flat Tax, Fair Tax, 11 J.
LEGis. 521 (1984); Bradley, Let's Have the Fair Tax, 70 A.B.A.J. 12 (July 1984); Bur-
ton, Major Tax Reform Proposals at a Glance, 23 TAx NOTES 1095 (June 1984); Phil-
lips & Previts, Tax Reform: What are the Issues? 155 J. ACCOUNTANCY 64 (1983);
Fellows, The Rebirth of the Flat-Rate Income Tax, 35 TAX ExEc. 230 (1983); Kasten,
Tax Reform: Two Proposals, 97 L.A. Daily J., July 26, 1984, at 4, col. 3; Flat-Rate
Tax, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Flat-Rate, Broad Based Income
Taxation, Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
125. H.R. 170, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (introduced Jan. 3, 1983 by Rep.
Hansen, R.-Idaho); H.R. 542, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced Jan. 6, 1983 by
Rep. Crane, R.-Ill.); H.R. 1664, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced Feb. 24, 1983
by Rep. Paul, R.-Tex); H.R. 1770, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced Mar. 2,
1983 by Rep. Dreir, R.-Cal.); H.R. 2137, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced Mar.
16, 1983 by Rep. Paul, R.-Tex); H.R. 2520, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced
Apr. 13, 1983 by Rep. Panetta, D.-Cal); H.R. 3516, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (intro-
duced July 11, 1983, by Rep. Young, R.-Alaska); H.R. 4776, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) (introduced Feb. 7, 1984 by Rep. Quillen, R.-Tenn); H.R. 4871, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984) (introduced Feb. 21, 1984 by Rep. Dannemeyer, R.-Cal.); H.R. 5432, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced Apr. 11, 1984 by Rep. Siljander, R.-Mich.); H.R.
5484, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced Apr. 12, 1984 by Rep. Paul, R.-Tex.);
H.R. 5711, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced May 23, 1984 by Rep. Shelby, D.-
Ala.); H.R. 6364, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced Oct. 2, 1984 by Rep. Moore,
R.-La.); H.R. 6420, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced Oct. 5, 1984 by Rep.
Heftel, D.-Haw.); S. 557, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced Feb. 23, 1983 by Sen.
DeConcini, D.-Ariz.); S. 1040, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced Apr. 13, 1983
by Sen. Quayle, R.-Ind.); S. 205, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced Aug. 4, 1983
by Sen. Helms, R.-N.C.).
Eight flat-tax proposals have already been introduced to the 99th Congress, including:
S. 321, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced Jan. 31, 1985 by Sen. DeConcini, D.-
Ariz.); S. 325, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced Jan. 31, 1985 by Sen. Kasten,
R.-Wis.); S. 409, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) (introduced Feb. 6, 1985 by Sen. Bradley,
D.-N.J.); H.R. 200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced Jan. 3, 1985 by Rep. Sil-
jander, R.-Mich.); H.R. 416, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced Jan. 3, 1985 by
Rep. Quillen, R.-Tenn.); H. R. 623, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) (introduced Jan. 22,
1985 by Rep. Young, R.-Alaska); H.R. 777, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced
Jan. 30, 1985 by Rep. Kemp, R.-N.Y.); H.R. 800, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (intro-
duced Jan. 30, 1985 by Rep. Gephardt, R.-Mo.).
126. H.R. 5533 & S. 2600, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 4940 (1984)
(introduced Apr. 26, 1984 by Sen. Kasten, R.-Wis, and Rep. Kemp, R.-N.Y.) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Kemp-Kasten].
127. H.R. 3271 & S. 1421, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 CONG. REC. 7841 (1983)
(introduced June 8-9, 1983, reintroduced Aug. 10, 1984 by Rep. Gephardt and Sen.
Bradley, D.-N.J.) [hereinafter cited as Bradley-Gephardt].
128. Kemp-Kasten and Bradley-Gephardt are not "true" flat tax systems because
they provide for graduated rates (15 and 30% for Kemp-Kasten; 14, 26, and 28% for
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Kasten and Bradley-Gephardt share many of the same fundamental
characteristics, they will be considered together in this discussion.
The bills include, among other things, the lowering of the marginal
rates for individuals and corporations, 129 the elimination of many tax
preferences, 30 the modification of the General Utilities doctrine,"'
and certain adjustments to capital gains treatment.3 2 Overall, the
sponsors of these bills assert that they would provide for a simpler,
fairer, and more efficient tax system.3 3
As discussed above, the harshness of subjecting corporate distribu-
tions to a double tax is one of the arguments against corporate gain
recognition on liquidation.13 4 This harshness would be diminished,
however, with substantially lower rates and a broader tax base be-
cause all distributions would be treated equally, and taxed approxi-
mately thirty-five to forty percent."35 In the case of capital gains
properties, the results are even more dramatic. Instead of a forty-two
percent tax, the tax under a fiat tax system would only be twenty-six
percent. 13 6
Second, the sufficient price argument 37 loses further support with
Bradley-Gephardt) as opposed to a single tax rate for all levels of income. Nevertheless,
by lowering the marginal rates, broadening the tax base, and eliminating many tax pref-
erences, incentives for labor and investment are increased while transaction costs are
reduced. See Doucette, supra note 116, at 39-53, 62-64.
129. Kemp-Kasten would impose individual tax rates of 15% for incomes less than
$50,000 and 30% for incomes over $50,000. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 126, at 4961.
Bradley-Gephardt imposes a tax of 14% for incomes less than $40,000 (joint return) or
$25,000 (non-married individuals); a tax of 26% for incomes between $40,000 and
$65,000 (joint) or between $25,000 and $37,500 (non-married); and 28% for incomes
greater than $65,000 (joint) or $32,500 (non-married). Bradley-Gephardt, supra note
127, at 7845.
130. Id.
131. Both Kemp-Kasten and Bradley-Gephardt utilize the same language in call-
ing for the modification of General Utilities. Amendments to I.R.C. §§ 311 and 336, as
well as the repeal of §§ 337 and 338(c) achieve this goal. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 126,
at 4961; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 127, at 7845.
132. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 126, at 4960; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 127, at
7841.
133. The sponsors of both bills proclaimed that they would be "simpler and
fairer." See supra notes 126 and 127. But see Conable, How Fair Is it Really? 70
A.B.A.J. 12 (July 1984); Schenk, The Effects of a Broad-Based Flat Rate Income Tax
on the Average Taxpayer, 23 TAx NOTES 923 (1984).
134. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
135. Assuming a 14 or 15% individual rate and a 20-25% corporate rate, the tax
would be between 35 and 40%. See supra note 129.
136. With capital gain properties, the tax would be 26% which is only slightly
more than the current 21% tax with the nonrecognition of gain rules.
137. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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a flat tax. A low flat-rate tax, of only ten to fifteen percent," 8 is an
insufficient price to pay when basis is significantly stepped-up on
highly appreciated property and no gain is recognized by the corpo-
ration upon liquidation. 139 Moreover, for a majority of taxpayers, the
margin between the capital gains rate and the ordinary income rate
will be significantly narrowed under the flat tax proposals. 140
Third, the fiat tax might alter the behavior and outlook of corpo-
rations and shareholders regarding distributions. For example, a cor-
poration might decide, using a cost-benefit analysis, that it would be
easier and less costly to declare dividends (which would be taxed at
substantially lower rates) than to avoid the recognition of gain by
liquidation. Using sound business judgment, corporations and share-
holders might be willing to pay a moderate tax now rather than sub-
sequently pay expensive fees in attempting to avoid or decrease the
impact of the recognition rules.
Fourth, the adoption of a flat tax system and the elimination of
various code sections, especially section 341, would lead to a reduc-
tion in transaction costs.' 41 Transaction costs are the "costs of ob-
taining information about alternatives and of negotiating, pricing,
and enforcing contracts." 42 Clearly, if General Utilities was re-
pealed and a flat tax was enacted, transaction costs would be re-
duced for both corporations and shareholders. For example, in order
to avoid recognition of gain, a taxpayer currently might seek to qual-
ify its transaction as a reorganization under section 368. This proce-
dure has substantial transaction costs such as interpreting the statu-
tory language, drafting contracts to ensure that the transfer falls
within section 368(a), avoiding the collapsible corporation provisions,
and discussing form and substance with all parties to insure that
they receive "their preferred" tax treatment.
Imposing a flat tax and modifying General Utilities under the
Kemp-Kasten or Bradley-Gephardt models would seem to solve most
of the problems of the current nonrecognition of gain system for liq-
138. See supra note 129.
139. For example, if the basis is increased twenty-fold at liquidation, then serious
revenue losses will occur without recognition of this appreciation.
140. This effect might even change the dividend policy of certain corporations but
this possible effect needs to be examined. Dividend policy is a difficult subject to genera-
lize about because corporations base their dividend decisions on various factors such as
income, retained earnings, cash flow, interest rates, and past dividends paid. Further dis-
cussion of dividend policy is beyond the scope of this article.
141. See generally Doucette, supra note 116, at 39-53. The flat tax greatly reduces
transaction costs in four areas: simplicity in payment and collection, behavior and mea-
surement, lawful tax avoidance, and allocation of resources.
142. DeAlesi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X Efficiency, 73 AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REvIEw 64 (1983). Others have defined transaction costs more broadly, see,
e.g., D. North, Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History (March 8, 1983)
(paper presented at the University of Southern California).
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uidations, including the need to create exceptions to relieve harsh-
ness of double taxation. Nevertheless, it is presently unclear whether
a flat tax without the modification of the General Utilities doctrine
would solve these problems. 4"
Integration
The second possible solution to the General Utilties problem is in-
tegration of the personal and corporate income tax systems. Current
reports have based their conclusions on the assumed continuation of
the current two-tier "classical" system, where income of the corpora-
tion is taxed once at the corporate level and again at the shareholder
level when distributed.' At least one commentator suggests, that
integration is a necessary step for tax reform.'1 5 Additionally, some
commentators recommend abolition of the corporate tax altogether
because it cannot be squared with any "canons of taxation."1' 46
The purpose of integration is to eliminate the effect of double tax-
ation which leads to distortions in economic efficiency and equity.1 47
Distortions in economic efficiency occur in three ways. 48 First, eco-
nomic efficiency is adversely affected by heavier taxation of busi-
nesses in the corporate sector as compared with the noncorporate
sector. In the corporate sector, the burden of taxation depends on the
extent to which earnings are distributed. Since market forces react
slower to changes in the economy when the amount of investment
143. Currently, no tax proposals suggest adoption of a flat tax without modification
of the General Utilities doctrine. But, if we assume a Bradley-Gephardt/Kemp-Kasten
system without this modification, some analysis is possible. Lower tax rates might lessen
the differential in treatment of interim distributions and liquidations because the
"spread" in taxation/nontaxation would be less. Additionally, lower tax rates might
change the incentives to liquidate if corporations consider the tax rates insignificant in
determining their dissolution strategy. Complexity would persist, however, with the col-
lapsible corporation and reorganization provisions. Further discussion of these issues is
beyond the scope of this article.
144. ALl REPORT, supra note 8, at 6; STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
145. McClure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The
Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REv. 532 (1975). See
also Cohen, The Meaning of the Changes Within the Framework of Subchapter C and
the Impact on Proposals for Integration of the Corporate and Individual Tax, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 319 (author suggests that the problems of General Utilities can be im-
proved with an integrated form of tax).
146. See, e.g., McLure, The Case for Integrating the Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L
TAX J. 257 (1975); R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 173-79 (1959). But
see R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 24-43 (1951).
147. McClure, supra note 145, at 534-49.
148. Nolan, Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, 30 MAJOR
TAX PLAN. 899, 902-03 (1978).
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dollars is uncertain due to unknown tax consequences, private sector
adjustments are inefficient in reallocating the burdens of taxation.
Second, economic efficiency is adversely affected because the current
tax system encourages retention of corporate earnings which are
then controlled by corporate managers and not capital markets. Cap-
ital markets, presumably influenced by'supply and demand, operate
more efficiently than managerial whims. Third, since debt financing
is encouraged over equity financing because of the availability of the
interest deduction to the corporation, corporations have investment
strategies which increase risk and diminish flexibility.14 9
Equity is adversely affected in two ways. 15 0 High income share-
holders, by owning a majority of the outstanding shares, can cause a
corporation to retain earnings, thereby avoiding the effect of progres-
sive individual tax rates. Additionally, low income shareholders bear
the burden of a proportional corporate tax because it may be higher
than their own individual marginal tax rates. For example, a twenty
percent shareholder probably has fewer deductions than a fifty per-
cent shareholder, so the effective tax rate of the former is probably
higher than that of the latter; consequently, the heavier burden of a
forty-six percent corporate tax falls upon the twenty percent
taxpayer.
In summary, then, the current corporate income tax system leads
to adverse effects on the efficiency and equity of the economy. Propo-
nents of integration argue that capital formation would be increased
by eliminating these efficiency and equity distortions.1 51 Arguably, it
is "unfair and uneconomic . . . to tax at both the corporate and
shareholder levels," but Congress has not yet integrated corporate
and shareholder taxes. 52
If Congress, however, chooses to integrate, there are basically
three methods of integration that could be utilized: full integration,
the dividend deduction system, and the shareholder credit method. 53
149. A corporation that finances transactions via debt obligations (loans, securities,
etc.) loses flexibility because it must make fixed payments each period until the obliga-
tions are satisfied. Additionally, the possibility of default (or bankruptcy) increases the
risk of the venture; therefore, the corporation must retain greater reserves to decrease the
risk. On the other hand, since dividends are not mandatory, equity financing does not
require fixed payments and it reduces risk.
150. Nolan, supra note 148, at 903.
151. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION TO THE TASK FORCE ON CAPI-
TAL FORMATION OF COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX POLICY AND CAPITAL FORMA-
TION (Apr. 4, 1977). But see Report on the Integration of Corporate and Individual
Income Taxes, 31 TAX LAW. 37 (1977) (Tax Section of the New York State Bar Associ-
ation; skeptics argue that an increased level of corporate distributions may not lead to a
higher level of savings).
152. Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 631.
153. These three methods will be presented in simplified form. For further discus-
sion and analysis, see Nolan, supra note 148; Cox, The Corporate Income Tax and Inte-
gration: A Summary of Positions and Prospects for Change, 58 TAXES 10 (1980); Mc-
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Full integration would require the elimination of the corporate tax
entirely. The income of corporations would be distributed to share-
holders, generally in a manner similar to that utilized for partner-
ships. Taxation of corporate distributions would be eliminated, ex-
cept, perhaps, to the extent made from earnings and profits
accumulated prior to enactment of an integration system.154 The
Treasury Department has recommended full integration; no country,
however, has ever adopted this type of system.1 55
The full integration system is viewed by some commentators as
the most equitable and neutral alternative to the present system.1 56
Huge costs and numerous administrative problems, however, furnish
the biggest obstacles to the full integration system. For example,
how will income be allocated among shareholders? Additionally, how
will income be allocated among different classes of stock with differ-
ent rights? Furthermore, how will corporate preferences be passed to
shareholders? 157 These problems of full integration make implemen-
tation impractical.
A second method of integration is the dividend deduction, or split
rate, system. This method allows a deduction to the corporation for
dividends paid, comparable to the current treatment of interest paid.
To the extent that earnings are distributed and the integration is
"complete," this results in a single tax at individual progressive
rates. 58
The major benefit of this approach is that it eliminates the present
preference for debt financing. 59 Additionally, this approach would
Clure, supra note 145.
154. Nolan, supra note 148, at 909.
155. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAx REFORM (1977)
[hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS]. This proposal makes a strong case for full integration.
Additionally, serious consideration was given to full integration by Canada and Ger-
many. See Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience, 31 TAx
LAW. 65 (1977).
156. See Cohen, Possible Solutions to Practical Problems in Integration of the
Corporate and Shareholder Income Tax, 28 NAT'L TAX. J. 359 (1975). See also Mc-
Clure, supra note 145.
157. The Treasury Department proposal offered several solutions to these problems
of administration. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 155, at 69-74.
158. Nolan, supra note 148, at 906. Interestingly, this system was used in Ger-
many for over 20 years with some success. Id. at 907.
159. See Goode, The Postwar Corporate Tax Structure, TAX INST. SYMPOSiUM 54
(1946). By allowing deductions for both interest and dividends, the preference for debt
financing is eliminated because both equity and debt financing are equally preferable.
The effect is that corporations can be more flexible with their investment decisions be-
cause they can choose between equity or debt financing without having to consider harm-
ful tax consequences. Additionally, since risk is more diversified, it is more neutral and
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provide immediate relief from the corporate tax. 160 This approach
contains several disadvantages, however, including difficulty of ad-
ministration, injury to cash flow, and higher costs for retained
earnings. 1
The third method of integration is the shareholder credit system
where tax relief occurs entirely at the shareholder level.'62 In es-
sence, a shareholder adds up his or her dividend for the corporate
tax already paid on it, includes this amount in adjusted gross in-
come, and then takes a credit for the corporate tax paid. For exam-
ple, a fifty-four dollar dividend would be increased to one hundred
dollars by the forty-six dollar corporate tax attributed to it. The one
hundred dollars would be taxed at the individual's regular progres-
sive rate which, if it were thirty-five percent, would leave the individ-
ual with an eleven dollar credit to use against tax on other income.' 63
France, Great Britain, and Canada utilize this system.
The shareholder credit system would simplify the tax system be-
cause all adjustments would be made by the individual taxpayer.
Administrative problems would arise, however, in determining the
proper amount of corporate tax includible in the calculation. 64
Having briefly examined these three approaches to integration, an
analysis of whether these systems will eliminate or reduce the
problems of General Utilities follows.
The full integration approach would eliminate the problems of
nonrecognition of gain in liquidations because, without a corporate
tax, no double taxation occurs. A single tax is imposed at the share-
holder level only, thus, eliminating corporate recognition of gain on
any interim distribution or liquidation. The complexities associated
with collapsible corporations and reorganizations would also disap-
pear because these code sections characterize income and would pre-
sumably be unnecessary to properly calculate corporate net income.
Assuming the income of corporations could be allocated to share-
holders in a simple and efficient manner, the problems of General
Utilities would disappear.
The dividend deduction system would create a preference for high-
dividend paying stocks because shareholders would attempt to maxi-
mize deductions by purchasing shares of corporations that pay large
more resistant to inflation.
160. Cox, supra note 153, at 20. Since corporations receive an immediate deduc-
tion, they retain more funds to divert to other areas of their business sooner because of
the decrease in tax liability.
161. Id.
162. Nolan, supra note 148, at 905.
163. A $46 credit from corporate tax less $35 individual income tax results in an
$11 credit. See BREAK & PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM
107 (1975).
164. Cox, supra note 153, at 21.
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and frequent dividends. It might also result in higher dividend pay-
ments and reductions in retained earnings. 65
Upon liquidation, there would be strong incentive to distribute all
the assets of the corporation as a dividend to minimize the tax liabil-
ity of the corporation, by maximizing the dividend deduction. This
same strategy, however, would maximize tax liability of shareholders
because dividends are taxed as ordinary income to them. Conse-
quently, the problems of General Utilities remain because interim
distributions and liquidations continue to be taxed differently with
liquidations still preferable.
The shareholder credit method seems to be the system most likely
to be adopted in the United States because it would improve the
current system without radically altering it. It would appear to re-
duce the General Utilities problem of treating liquidations and in-
terim distributions differently because shareholders would receive a
credit based on the amount of corporate earnings distributed and
corporate tax paid. Shareholders would receive this credit regardless
of the type of distribution, but presumably it would occur most fre-
quently in connection with dividends. As a result, shareholders in a
liquidation would receive a smaller credit because the corporation
would recognize no gain as a result of the liquidation under the cur-
rent tax structure. In an interim distribution, however, the corpora-
tion would recognize gain and shareholders would receive a larger
credit. Thus, the ultimate result to shareholders would be approxi-
mately the same because where nonrecognition occurs (liquidations)
the shareholder receives no credit but does receive a credit in a rec-
ognition situation (interim distribution).
CONCLUSION
The rule of corporate nonrecognition of gain in liquidations, as
well as the remnants of the General Utilities doctrine in other areas
of the corporate tax law, pose problems to the current system, in-
cluding unequal treatment of liquidations and interim distributions,
165. See Feldstein, Corporate Tax Integration and Capital Accumulation, Discus-
sion Paper #437, Harvard Inst. of Economic Research 4 (1975).
Because the double tax system is retained, interesting problems would be posed to
directors regarding dividend strategy. Should they increase the amount of dividends
thereby increasing shareholder tax liability and decreasing corporate tax liability? Alter-
natively, should they decrease the amount of dividends thereby increasing corporate tax
liability and decreasing shareholder liability? The answers would depend, in part, on
what kind of "hats" (majority shareholder, independent director, employer, etc.) the di-
rectors wear.
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complexity, and non-neutrality. Repealing this classical doctrine
seems the best solution to these problems because a simple, neutral,
and uniform corporate tax could be achieved. Alternative solutions
are available, however, and should be considered before a fundamen-
tal change is made to the corporate tax system. The shareholder
credit method of integration would alleviate the perceived problems
of the current system while keeping the current system largely in-
tact. Additionally, if major tax reform is considered, a flat tax, cou-
pled with the repeal of General Utilities, would be the best solution
because it would simplify and improve the overall tax system.
DENNIS J. DOUCETTE
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